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The tangle of colonial modernity: Hong Kong as 
a distinct linguistic and conceptual space within 
the global common law 
Christopher Hutton
Introduction
Hong Kong, or more formally, the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region (SAR), is a common law jurisdiction within the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC). Hong Kong was officially a British colony 
from 1843 to 1997, although colonial rule began in practice in 
1841. Post-1997 Hong Kong is unusual in that it is a common law 
jurisdiction within a civil law state, the legal system of which was set 
up initially on the Soviet model. The People’s Republic of China is a 
unitary state under one party rule, and no power can be permanently 
ceded from the centre. Hong Kong is therefore a zone of discretionary 
exception created under the ‘one country, two systems’ policy, albeit 
one buttressed by an international agreement, the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration of 1984, and formalised in the Basic Law. A striking 
feature of this constitutional arrangement is that it is time-bound. The 
‘high degree of autonomy’ promised to Hong Kong expires on June 30, 
2047, with the subsequent special status of Hong Kong, if any, yet to 
be determined. 
This paper begins with an account of the fictional ideal of the 
linguistic and conceptual unity of the common law. It moves on to 
review aspects of Hong Kong’s legal history, focusing on tensions 
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in the unfolding of Hong Kong’s colonial modernity. These tensions 
between the cross-jurisdictional conceptual unity of the common law 
and the recognition of Hong Kong’s culturally distinct status are then 
illustrated through a number of cases. In particular, Hong Kong’s 
distinctiveness is up for discussion in two classes of legal decisions. 
The first represent classic instances of ‘legal pluralism’, involving the 
application of principles of Chinese customary law by the Hong Kong 
administrative authorities (in particular through the district officer 
system) and the courts. These cases involve what are understood as 
traditional Chinese social institutions, family structures, forms of 
marriage, adoption and intergenerational possession and transmission 
of property. Linguistic and conceptual parity between the mainstream 
common law and traditional Chinese culture is not presumed, and the 
correct translation and anthropological interpretation of key cultural 
concepts is at issue. The second class of cases is much more nebulous. 
This is where courts in the course of a common law judgment explicitly 
evoke the different nature of Hong Kong society and its ‘Chineseness’, 
for example in relation to the definition of basic terms such as wife 
and woman.
1 The ideal conceptual unity of the common law
The fundamental principle of common law interpretative practice 
is the so-called ‘plain meaning’ or ‘ordinary meaning’ rule. Ordinary 
words and their everyday meanings operate as the default setting of 
the common law, and law’s departures from ordinary meaning must be 
justified by specific elements of legal culture (Hutton 2014: 41).1 The 
common law understands itself as an essentially universal jurisdiction, 
in that it is not tied to local conditions or conceptual micro-worlds. 
This (quasi-)universal jurisdiction is also the domain of the English 
language, which, at least from the perspective of the centre, is largely 
co-extensive with it.2 By ‘English language’ is meant in this context 
neither a sociologically identifiable variety nor an ethnically defined 
mother tongue. Rather ‘English’ represents a legal Esperanto, a set 
of assumptions about the language of the common law, namely that 
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it possesses definitional stability, conceptual transparency, universal 
applicability and the ability to carry and sustain the coherence of legal 
reasoning across multiple contexts of application. It represents an ideal 
form of English which exists in uneasy relation to its sociologically 
messy, ill-defined real world analogue, the English language. 
It follows that the common law understands itself to be transparent 
between jurisdictions, in the sense that these are in constant dialogue 
and exchange. This conversation between different (autonomous or 
semi-autonomous) legal systems and their different sub-domains, 
operates centripetally, in part because of centres of authoritative decision 
making (such as the Privy Council, the United Kingdom Supreme 
Court, the United States Supreme Court) and in part because this 
dialogue is anchored in the historical legacy of the common law and 
its fundamental reservoir of cases, principles and modes of reasoning. 
In its essence the common law is held to stand unchanging outside 
the historical contexts of its application, though it may paradoxically 
be adapted to those contexts: ‘The Common Law may develop but it 
cannot change’ (Chan Wei-keung v R per Huggins J, 846). 
The inter-jurisdictional dialogue is, of course, not one between 
equals: for example the Hong Kong courts were, in general, bound 
by decisions of the House of Lords and the Privy Council before the 
end of colonial rule in 1997 (Wesley-Smith 1988: 191; 215). In the 
twenty-five years before 1997 the Hong Kong courts consistently drew 
on English cases for over 70% of their citations, with around 20% being 
from Hong Kong (Wesley-Smith 1999). 
In addition to this cross-jurisdictional dialogue, there exists the 
presumption of a linguistic-conceptual world that is shared between 
the domain of law and the society over which it governs. The ideal of 
the comprehensibility of law, was expressed in a statement by Cozens-
Hardy MR in Camden (Marquis) v Inland Revenue Commissioners (647):
I thought that a modern Act of Parliament was framed in a language which 
is intelligible to everybody, and which applied not to any local custom or 
consideration of that kind, but to the whole of Great Britain (and I think 
beyond that, elsewhere, but at any rate to the whole of England).
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This statement blurs the universal applicability of law, in that it 
is held to apply universally within its jurisdiction (and to disregard 
matters of local practice or belief) with the principle of its universal 
intelligibility. The hesitation about the geographical boundaries of this 
jurisdiction reflects the fact that it is a purely imagined or ideal domain 
– it is not possible to make it precise sociologically or sociolinguistically. 
Few ‘ordinary people’ can read an Act of Parliament and gain an 
accurate sense of its legal effect. The actual sociological boundaries of 
this (idealised) English are impossible to determine, but, in this fictional 
or ideal sense, it is possible to imagine a judge knowing the language 
completely. Baron Martin expressed this in the form of a rhetorical 
question:  ‘is not the Judge bound to know the meaning of all words in 
the English language; or if they are used technically or scientifically, to 
inform his own mind by evidence, and then to determine their meaning?’ 
(Hills v The London Gaslight Co, per Baron Martin, 63).
The presumption of conceptual universality operates unseen as a 
foundational fiction of law. In practice, it is a rebuttable presumption, 
once conceptual difference is explicitly at issue in a particular case. If 
one looks at the history of a jurisdiction like Hong Kong, this ideal 
of a conceptually unified common law comes very sharply into focus, 
and, on occasion, the fiction breaks down or is set aside as a matter of 
policy. So while historically, much of the explicit work of Hong Kong 
legal culture has been the fine-tuning of the relationship between the 
wider common law, in particular the law of England and Wales, and 
the legal culture of Hong Kong, a deeper unstated assumption has been 
at work that the basic conceptual resources of the English language 
constitute a shared and stable backdrop to both jurisdictions. Words 
of ordinary English (such as person, man, woman, child, wife) are taken 
for legal purposes as having the same meaning in Britain and Hong 
Kong, as are basic legal terms of art such as contract, trust, equity, mens 
rea. These terms are held to be part of the conceptual world of both 
the original jurisdiction and its colonial transplant.
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2 Too much or too little?
The question of whether Hong Kong has been, fundamentally, a 
Chinese society under a thin veneer of colonial administration, or 
whether it is better characterised as a cosmopolitan (quasi-) city-state 
run on free trade principles, runs through the entirety of Hong Kong’s 
legal and social history. It has commonly been argued that while Hong 
Kong is ‘a modern city’, the Chinese population is westernised only 
in a ‘superficial sense’ (Wong 1986: 307; Hsu 1992: 51). Even on the 
city-state model, it has been argued that traditional Chinese family 
structures, with their ‘capacity to mobilise seed capital and to provide 
emergency funds’ and ‘a favourable regulatory framework’ which 
encouraged risk-taking underlay the economic success of Hong Kong 
(Cullen 206: 43). British colonial rule placed Hong Kong outside the 
social and economic reforms of Republican China (founded 1911) 
and beyond the reach of the radical communist modernity of the 
People’s Republic (founded 1949). Nonetheless Hong Kong has been 
understood as modern in the sense that it is ‘westernised’, with that 
modernity being primarily understood as economic, administrative 
and juridical (the ‘rule of law’). 
This problematic colonial modernity leads to two contrasting 
criticisms of British colonialism. For some, colonialism is seen as having 
imposed ‘too much modernity’, for example, by introducing or imposing 
forms of modernity that go beyond the provision of administrative and 
economic order to operate directly on the private sphere. Such critics 
generally speak on behalf of an (essentialised) traditional Chinese 
culture. Colonial rule in Hong Kong is seen as a channel for inauthentic 
westernisation and for the imposition of alien moral values, including 
liberal individualism. Alternatively, British rule in Hong Kong has 
been seen as wrongly denying its subjects access to ‘full’ modernity, 
as represented by equality before the law and the rights and political 
freedoms granted to citizens of modern democracies. The colonial 
Hong Kong government on this view conspired with the local Chinese 
(patriarchal) elite to deny progressive reforms to Hong Kong society. 
The criticism of ‘too much modernity’ in the domain of language politics 
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targets the colonial imposition of English; the criticism of ‘too little 
modernity’ points to the denial of equal access to English in a socially 
stratified education system. 
3 One territory, two legal cultures
The original seizure of Hong Kong was accompanied by two 
proclamations (Lewis 1983: 348-9). The first was issued on February 
11, 1841 by Commodore Bremer as Commander-in-Chief and 
Captain Elliott as Plenipotentiary. It was addressed to the ‘Chinese 
inhabitants’ and included the pledge they would be
secured in the free exercise of their religious rights, ceremonies, and 
social customs and in the enjoyment of their lawful private property 
and interests. They will be governed, pending Her Majesty’s further 
pleasure, according to the laws, customs and usages of the Chinese 
(every description of torture excepted) by the elders of villages, subject 
to the control of a British magistrate.
The second, issued by Captain Elliott and dated February 2, 1841, 
renewed the pledge that the ‘natives of the island of Hong Kong’ 
would be ‘governed according to the laws and customs of China, 
every description of torture excepted’. In addition, ‘British subjects 
and foreigners residing in, or resorting to, the island of Hong Kong, 
shall enjoy full security and protection, according to the principles and 
practice of British law’. In spite of their uncertain legal status (Wesley-
Smith 1995), the Hong Kong courts have, on occasion, treated these 
pronouncements as foundational statements (HKSAR v Ma Wai Kwan, 
David & Others). 
There were a series of precedents for this dual system, including an 
1807 Charter of Justice for Penang. Under this, and a subsequent 1826 
Charter for Penang, Malacca, and Singapore, the Chinese inhabitants 
of British settlements were guaranteed protection for their religious 
beliefs and social customs, though ‘the extent to which English law 
was modified to pay this respect to local usages was unclear’ (Freedman 
1979: 94). Hong Kong, unlike the Straits colonies, had been part of 
the Qing Empire, and the term ‘Chinese customary law’ covers both 
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the formal rules of imperial Qing law and local customs and usages 
attested in particular regions or lineages. Early Hong Kong laws set 
out a framework for two parallel systems, but again theory and practice 
were unclear. An Ordinance to Regulate Summary Proceedings before 
Justices of the Peace (1844) ‘provided that Chinese offenders were to be 
punished according to Chinese usage’ (Norton-Kyshe 1898: 20). The 
Supreme Court Ordinance (1844) affirmed that ‘the law of England 
shall be in full force in the said Colony of Hong Kong, except where 
the same shall be inapplicable to the local circumstances of the said 
Colony, or of its inhabitants’. It stressed the primacy of property rights 
in the new colony and the indivisibility of its sovereignty: 
provided nevertheless, that in all matters and questions touching the 
right or title to any real property in the said Colony, the law of England 
shall prevail, and that no law shall be recognized in the said Colony, 
which shall in any way derogate from the sovereignty of the Queen 
of England (cited in The Queen v Wong King Chau and Others [1964] 
HKDCLR 94, at 101).
These founding statements envisaged a ‘dual prospective system of 
law’ (Ho Tze Tun v Ho Au Shi and others: 79; Cheung 1996: 69), albeit in 
an unequal and unstable relationship. According to the legal historian 
Norton-Kyshe (1898: 19), the decision to institute this dual system 
was not without controversy. ‘Public opinion’, i.e. that of Europeans 
in the colony, saw it as ‘ill-judged and impolitic that Chinese residents 
should be amenable to their own laws and usages’ (Norton-Kyshe 1898: 
19). The argument was that although ‘the large bulk of the population 
was Chinese and mostly of the worse class, still the British laws were 
admirably suited to their necessities and fully adequate to all their moral 
and social exigencies’. The policy which had been applied elsewhere 
of guaranteeing ‘the maintenance of the laws, franchise, and customs, 
besides the official use of the languages, of conquered countries’ was 
a ‘capital error’. There existed ‘an English patois which was regularly 
taught in schools and was spoken by thousands in Hongkong’. This 
was ‘of immense value’; further, it was the wish of ‘the intelligent 
classes of the Chinese to know more of use and of our institutions’. 
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These natives should be encouraged to adopt ‘our customs, manners, 
and language’, and this could only be effected ‘by making all residents 
in Hongkong amenable to British laws, and to none other whatsoever’ 
(Norton-Kyshe 1898: 20). This was in effect a debate about the degree 
to which, at least as far as the law was concerned, British colonialism 
in Hong Kong should take the form of what was later termed ‘indirect 
rule’ (see Ho 2006).
Norton-Kyshe’s evocation of high-minded debate about the 
appropriate system of law for the Chinese residents somewhat 
misrepresents the inchoate and often chaotic and racist nature of the 
early Hong Kong legal system, in particular the criminal law. While 
some Chinese residents responded positively to the possibility of a 
legal system that treated Europeans and Chinese equally (as opposed 
to the handing over of Chinese offenders to Qing officials), the reality 
was that the magistracy system was overburdened, marred by a lack 
of competent interpreters, and juries of Europeans decided the fate 
of Chinese defendants (see Munn 2001; 2013). In any case this ‘dual 
system’ aspect of Hong Kong’s legal pluralism diminished with time, 
very rapidly so in relation to the criminal law (Cheung 1996). What 
survived was Chinese customary law in relation to family structures, 
property and inheritance. The legal position was set out in the section 
5 of the Supreme Court Ordinance (1873): 
Such of the laws of England as existed when the Colony obtained a 
local legislature, that is to say, on the 5th day of April, 1843, shall be 
in force in the Colony, except so far as the said laws are inapplicable to 
the local circumstances of the Colony or of its inhabitants, and except 
so far as they have been modified by laws passed by the said legislature.
By the subsequent Application of English Law Ordinance (1966), 
it was affirmed that: ‘The common law and the rules of equity shall 
be in force in Hong Kong - (a) so far as they are applicable to the 
circumstances of Hong Kong or its inhabitants; (b) subject to such 
modifications as such circumstances may require’ (section 3). 
The acquisition by lease of (what became) the New Territories under 
the 1898 Convention of Peking was accompanied by a set of concessions 
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in relation to the established way of life of its inhabitants. The 
Convention contained assurances that there would be no expropriation 
of land and that any resumption of land would be compensated at a fair 
price (Wesley-Smith 1998: 320-1). Subsequently, the New Territories 
Ordinance (1910, section 13) provided: ‘In any proceedings in the High 
Court or the District Court in relation to land in the New Territories, 
the court shall have power to recognise and enforce any Chinese custom 
or customary right affecting such land’. A government report affirmed 
that Chinese customary law (rather than Qing statutory law) governed 
questions of land in the New Territories (Wesley-Smith 1998: 128, 
[Strickland Committee] 1953: 17). The descendants of the villagers 
registered at the time of the British take-over are to this day treated 
as indigenous inhabitants. This status is accompanied by various legal 
privileges. These include innovations by the colonial government, such 
as the right of male indigenous villagers to be allocated land for the 
building of a ‘small house’ (丁屋). This policy was formalised in 1972 
(Chiu 2006). In addition the indigenous population enjoys exemptions 
from certain planning laws and from registration for clan bodies under 
the Companies Ordinance (Cheung 1996: 74-5). The special position 
of the indigenous population is protected by Article 40 of the Basic 
Law (see Chan 2011).
4 The colonial time-lag
In the colonial era, the decision whether or not to copy UK legislation 
(and whether and how it should be modified) was highly indicative 
of the political reading of the socio-cultural differences between the 
UK and Hong Kong. The time-lag was in part a matter of practicality, 
in that Hong Kong was able to draw on the UK process of legislative 
reform and drafting. It was also a delay in the transplantation of human 
rights, in that the post-1945 colonial government could not without 
self-contradiction apply the full range of internationally-understood 
democratic human rights to Hong Kong. One element was explicitly 
cultural, in that Hong Kong was understood as an only partially 
modernised or semi-traditional Chinese society with its own distinct 
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moral codes and ethical attitudes. A further factor in the waxing 
and waning legal differentiation between the UK and Hong Kong 
was active steps taken by the colonial government to meet perceived 
exigencies in the Hong Kong situation, including social unrest and 
strikes. Such measures were frequently of a repressive nature, especially 
those concerning triad societies, sedition, public order, public meetings 
(Regulation of Chinese Ordinance No 3 of 1888), freedom of speech 
and censorship, (such as  the Control of Publications Consolidation 
Ordinance: 1951). Flogging and deportation were used as means of 
political control (see Keller 1992; Klein 1997). 
Often the human rights time-lag and the evocation of cultural 
difference coincided in effect. In Hong Kong the death penalty was 
formally abolished in 1993 (with the repeal of the Corporal Punishment 
Ordinance), though it had been effectively suspended since the last 
execution was carried out in 1966. The gap between these dates in 
part represents deference to public opinion in the colony. In Britain 
the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965 suspended the death 
penalty for murder and it was formally abolished in 1969 (though not 
until 1973 in Northern Ireland). Hong Kong’s Sex Discrimination 
Ordinance was enacted in 1995, twenty years after the UK’s Sex 
Discrimination Act of 1975. 
In the case of racial discrimination the ‘time-lag’ is even wider: the 
UK Race Relations Act was passed in 1976, whereas the Hong Kong 
Race Discrimination Ordinance was only enacted in 2008. In relation 
to the regulation of private, consensual sexual behavior, in 1865 Hong 
Kong adopted verbatim the English Offences Against the Persons 
Act 1861, which defined a set of ‘abominable offences’ (sections 49-
53). The Hong Kong Law Commission Report on Laws Concerning 
Homosexual Conduct (Law Commission 1983) adopted the approach 
of the 1957 Wolfenden Report, in that it accepted a disjunction 
between moral judgments about private consensual behaviour and the 
intervention of the criminal law (Law Commission 1983: 6-7). This was 
HLA Hart’s position in his famous debate with Patrick Devlin on the 
relationship between law, morality and the public-private distinction 
(Hart 1963; Devlin 1965). 
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One strand of the committee’s discussion was devoted to the 
argument that toleration of homosexuality would constitute a Western 
imposition on Hong Kong as a society shaped by traditional Chinese 
morality. Given Hong Kong’s Chinese character, one view expressed 
was that the government should adopt the stance of a moral leader. This 
was acknowledged by the committee: ‘We respect without reservation 
those who have urged upon us their conviction that Hong Kong is a 
Confucian society, and that the role of Government is therefore to 
set by law the moral tone for the community’ (1983: 4-5). This was 
analogous in effect to Thomas Aquinas’ understanding of natural 
law (Law Commission 1983: 5). The committee recognised that the 
metropolitan centre might be seen to be imposing its moral liberalism 
on a society which, if fully self-governed, would not have initiated such 
a reform. It noted a parallel between Hong Kong and Northern Ireland. 
But in response to assertions that homosexuality was not compatible 
with ‘traditional Chinese concepts of morality’ (1983: 122), the report 
documented in some detail discussions of homosexuality in Chinese 
literature and historical texts (1983: 14). It concluded from a survey that 
‘more countries in the region tolerate consensual homosexual conduct 
by adults in private than penalise it’ (1983: 67-68). 
The Sexual Offences Act (1967) decriminalised homosexual conduct 
between males over the age of twenty-one; the same reform was 
carried out in Hong Kong in 1991 by an amendment to the Crimes 
Ordinance. This left the age of consent for male homosexuals at 21 
in Hong Kong, whereas the age of consent for heterosexuals was 16. 
This disparity is in contrast to the UK Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 
of 2000 equalised the age of consent. In a judicial review of s.118C 
of the Crimes Ordinance (1971), the applicant in Leung TC William 
Roy v Secretary for Justice sought a declaration that the difference in 
the heterosexual and homosexual ages of consent offended the rights 
to equality and to privacy under the Basic Law and the Bill of Rights. 
To the government’s evocation of ‘the conservative attitude of the 
Hong Kong community in matters of sexual mores’ (para 105), the 
court retorted that in ‘a cosmopolitan society like Hong Kong “social 
norms and values” change, often rapidly’ (para 106). The court’s decision 
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that the age of consent was unconstitutional was upheld by the Court 
of Appeal (Secretary for Justice v Leung TC William Roy), though the 
government has to date not actually amended the text of the law. 
In terms of the socio-legal modernity of Hong Kong, the colonial 
government only gradually and reluctantly dismantled certain core 
social institutions of pre-modern Chinese society. The Female Domestic 
Service Ordinance of 1923 abolished the mui tsai 妹仔 system, whereby 
young girls were sold by poor families as bonded maidservants. For 
its critics, this system amounted to child slavery (Haslewood and 
Haslewood 1930), though the girls in question were normally able to 
get married once they reached adulthood. The 1923 law rejected the 
notion that one could acquire property rights in a person in exchange 
for a payment (section 2), though the institution persisted, since the law 
only forbade new contracts. It continued to be the subject of campaigns, 
government investigation and further legislative intervention (Jaschok 
1988; Liu 1994; Sheriff 2000). 
One underlying question was whether the institution, in its ideal 
or canonical form, could correctly be termed ‘child slavery’, or whether 
this was a pejorative label which masked anthropological ignorance. 
The argument of its defenders was that, while it could be abused, the 
system was in its essence philanthropic (see Pedersen 2001; Samuels 
2007; Pomfret 2008). This debate was part of a much broader legal 
engagement which involved the comparative mapping of Chinese 
concepts and institutions onto Western, specifically English, ones. 
However sophisticated (or not) the anthropological understanding of 
the mui tsai system, the need was for a definitive label and a ‘yes-no’ 
answer to the slavery question.
Concubinage remained an officially recognised social institution 
in Hong Kong until the Marriage Reform Ordinance of 1970. The 
Republic of China had enacted a Civil Code in 1930 which defined 
marriage as monogamous. A marriage was required to be formalised 
by a public ceremony with at least two witnesses (Article 982). The 
code made no direct reference to concubinage (Tran 2009). In 1950 
the People’s Republic of China enacted a further reform of marriage 
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through its New Marriage Law (新婚姻法), abolishing all feudal 
characteristics of the institution. The Hong Kong law of 1970 stipulated 
that after October 7, 1971 the only form of legal marriage would be 
a registered, monogamous partnership (Lee 2000: 231; Lam 2004: 
72-80), though existing traditional marriages were still recognised. 
Forms of perpetual intergenerational clan or lineage-based 
landholding such as the tso 祖 and the tong 堂 (Wong 1990), which 
would otherwise have been invalid under common law principles 
(in particular the rule against perpetuities), have been given formal 
recognition by the Hong Kong courts (Tang Kai Chung and another v 
Tang Chik Shang and others, 279):
a Tso may be shortly described as an ancient Chinese institution of 
ancestral landholding whereby land derived from a common ancestor 
is enjoyed by his male descendants for the time being living for their 
lifetimes and so from generation to generation indefinitely.
One way that common law judges have sought to bring the tso into 
the common law conceptual world is by analogy with the trust. But this 
attempt to map this customary law concept onto the common law has 
been rejected as muddling further an already confused situation (Merry 
2012). The dilemma is clear: in order for a common law court to analyse 
a particular factual scenario it is tempting to map a Chinese customary 
law concept onto a familiar common law one. But a customary law 
concept is by definition foreign to the common law. 
5 Word meanings and cultural difference: the definition of 
wife
Analogous difficulties arise in relation to family structure. The question 
of how to define wife was a recurrent problem in the understanding 
of traditional Chinese marriage and the institution of concubinage. 
In Ho Tsz Tsun v Ho Au Shi and others (1915) the court made a strong 
statement of the status and importance of ‘Chinese law and custom’ to 
the Chinese inhabitants of Hong Kong (73):
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Nor is to be believed that a conservative people, like the Chinese, are 
in the least likely to abandon their ancient system in a Colony where 
they are in an enormous majority, and which is on soil which was once 
part of the Chinese Empire.
In particular, China was a ‘polygamous country’ with a different 
understanding of marriage family line and inheritance. It was evident 
‘that the first wife has precedence, but that the other wives are wives and 
not merely concubines’ (73). The alternative characterisation was that 
the Chinese were monogamous. The judgment emphasized this point: 
‘in Hong Kong great care has always been taken by the Legislature 
and the Courts to draw a definite distinction between a wife (Tsai) 
and a concubine (Tsip) and to apply the words “marriage” and “wife” 
only to the former’. While a tsip 妾 was not a wife, the status reflected 
a recognised social institution: ‘the status of a Tsip in a Chinese family 
is recognised as very different from that of a mistress or kept woman, 
who, indeed, has no legal status whatsoever’ (C G Alabaster, Attorney 
General of Hong Kong, cited in the Strickland Report 1953: 137). 
One case where an issue within the common law had to be resolved 
with reference to customary law was Chan Hing-Cheung and others v The 
Queen (1974). The question was whether the rule of evidence that a wife 
was not a competent witness for the prosecution against her husband 
applied to a secondary wife or concubine (tsip 妾), as opposed to the 
principal wife (tsai 妻). The case was reducible to a simple principle: 
‘Stripped down, the present effect of s.6 [of the Evidence Ordinance] 
is that a wife may not give evidence against her husband, and vice 
versa, in criminal proceedings’ (para 24). But was the witness a wife in 
this relevant sense: ‘There can be no question that at Common Law in 
England a “wife” meant the female partner of a monogamous marriage’ 
(para 25). The court recapitulated the various historical statements 
about the limitations on the applicability of the common law, including 
Captain Elliot’s proclamations. The question was whether the common 
law was applicable to the ‘circumstances’ before the court:
The overwhelming ‘circumstance’ with which we are faced is that in 
Chinese law and custom, secondary wives have always been regarded as 
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lawful rather than bigamous. Concubinage continued to be recognised 
until the 7th October 1971 and the status of existing secondary wives 
at that date, including Madam Wong, continues to be recognised 
(para 25).
The court found that internal evidence as to the status of the tsip in 
customary law suggested she was a wife in the full sense of the word: 
‘We have seen that Madam Wong is entitled to maintenance equally 
with the principal wife, that her children are legitimate, that she would 
be entitled to administer the estate of her husband, and that she is part 
of the family’ (para 33). This was further buttressed by the decision 
of the Privy Council in Mawji v R, where the rule of evidence was 
extended to include any spouse in a potentially polygamous marriage 
that was legal under the law of Tanganyika (para 35):
We see no reason to think that whatever may have been originally the 
practical reason or reasons for the rule rendering spouses not competent 
as witnesses against each other (reasons conveniently enshrined in the 
Christian concept of the marriage union) those reasons which have 
been suggested are not equally applicable to a Chinese customary 
marriage. The fact that in some respects a tsip is of lower status than a 
tsai and, therefore of the wife of a monogamous union does not affect 
the basic similarity arising from the fact that she is a wife.
This went against some case law (e g  In The Estate of Chan Yan 
Deceased: 1925) where Sir Henry Gollan, C J , rejected the notion that 
a tsip妾was the wife of the testator ‘if that term is used in its ordinary 
meaning which limits its application to a kit fat [結髮 principal wife] 
or tin fong [填房 principal wife on remarriage]’ (36). But in the absence 
of any legislative intervention the Privy Council decision was binding. 
The murder convictions were quashed. The common law, almost in spite 
of itself, must here translate a culturally local and graded distinction 
into an ‘either-or’ one (‘wife or not-wife’), in the process drawing an 
analogy, via the Privy Council decision, with a marriage form in East 
Africa. The distinctive Chinese institution is re-imagined through a 
global common law understanding of other non-Chinese, non-modern, 
non-Western forms of marriage. 
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One can contrast these cases of foregrounded cultural difference 
with one where the general law of marriage was at stake. In W v 
Registrar of Marriages (litigated between 2010 and 2013) the issue was 
whether a post-operative transgender woman (with a birth certificate 
designating her as male) was a woman for the purposes of marriage in 
Hong Kong. This was a classic human rights ‘time-lag’ case, in that 
the authoritative case law in Hong Kong (Corbett v Corbett; Bellinger v 
Bellinger) and related statutory provisions (the Marriage and Ordinance 
1875; Matrimonial Causes Ordinance 1972) reflected a situation 
now superseded in the United Kingdom by the Gender Recognition 
Act 2004. This had been passed after the decision by the European 
Court of Human Rights in Goodwin v United Kingdom. The Hong 
Kong Marriage Ordinance provides ‘for the celebration of Christian 
marriages or the civil equivalent thereof ’, and under the Matrimonial 
Causes one ground for nullity is that ‘the parties are not respectively 
male and female’.5 The Christian and the modern are effectively 
fused in this legal framing, the implicit contrast being with Chinese 
customary marriage. 
The issue of transgender identity has offered a radical challenge to 
the presumption of a universal conceptual language for the common 
law. As Cheung J stated in the High Court, the question as far as 
statutory interpretation was one of the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the terms 
man and woman. These are terms which one might assume to have a 
single meaning across the common law world, a meaning which, once 
ascertained, could then be applied to the law of marriage. The English 
courts had used a mixture of biology and lexicography in arriving at the 
decision that a transgender woman was not a woman for the purpose 
of marriage, whereas in the Australian case of Re Kevin Chisholm J 
asserted (paras 289; 311) that the ordinary meaning of man and woman 
encompassed (post-operative) transgender identities (Hutton 2011). 
This meant that, in terms of the fictional English of the law, these 
words had a different ‘everyday, ordinary meaning’ in Australia than in 
England and Wales. Given that there were no statutory definitions of 
these terms, Cheung J treated the question in Hong Kong as a quasi-
sociological or sociolinguistic one:
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Whilst it is quite true that a sex reassignment surgery is colloquially 
referred to as a ‘sex change operation’ (變性手術), so far as the Court 
observes, the reference to ‘sex change’ (變性) in the ordinary usage does 
not, or does not yet, represent a general understanding or acceptance 
that the person’s ‘sex’ (whatever one understands the word to mean) 
has really been ‘changed’. I am therefore of the view that so far as the 
plain meaning of the text, or the plain and ordinary meaning of the 
relevant words, is concerned, the applicant has not established a case 
that the relevant words, according to their ordinary, everyday usage 
in Hong Kong nowadays, encompass post-operative transsexuals in 
their assigned sex (para 140).
On the argument in terms of constitutional rights, the judge stressed 
the distinct nature of Hong Kong as a ‘predominantly Chinese society’, 
so that the required social consensus for a widening of the constitutional 
right to marry was absent. This judgment defined Hong Kong society 
as a distinct linguistic and conceptual space from other jurisdictions, 
both more Chinese and, ironically, effectively more Christian than the 
UK: the judgment dealt at length with the colonial-Christian framing 
of marriage in Hong Kong (paras 114-116). The Court of Appeal upheld 
the judgment in relation to Hong Kong usage in English and Chinese 
(as well as on the related constitutional arguments) (W v Registrar of 
Marriages): 
There is very little evidence before the court regarding the ordinary, 
everyday usage of the relevant words in this jurisdiction. The evidence 
there is suggests that transsexuals are not generally referred to simply 
as ‘male’ or ‘female’ or ‘man’ or ‘woman’ (para 71). 
These statements about ordinary meaning are clearly at best 
sociolinguistic and sociological fictions, and cannot be taken seriously 
as descriptive generalisations. 
What is exposed here is the artificiality of law’s inquiry into ordinary 
meaning and the irrelevance of actual usage, even supposing it would 
be possible to capture it. What is masked is the specificity of law’s 
inquiry, since it asks for a definition of man and woman only for the 
purposes of the law of marriage. On the one hand, this might seem to 
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be the paradigm application of the ordinary meaning, since marriage 
is deemed to be a key social institution; on the other, the adjudication 
might be seen purely as a narrow inquiry for the purposes of law, which 
has no authority to make statements about the ordinary meaning of 
the terms man and woman for other purposes. This ambiguity shaped 
the original common law decision in Corbett (1970), where the judge, 
Ormrod J, sought to define the essence of human sexual identity: ‘It 
appears to be the first occasion on which a court in England has been 
called upon to decide the sex of an individual and, consequently, there 
is no authority which is directly in point’ (105). The decision depended 
on what he termed ‘true sex’ (89). At the same time the judge disavowed 
any such intention, limiting himself to the requirements of the law of 
marriage. At issue was what was ‘meant by the word “woman” in the 
context of a marriage’, it was not the task of the judgment ‘to determine 
the “legal sex” of the respondent at large’ (Corbett, 106)
The Court of Final Appeal in W v Registrar of Marriages (2013) 
chose to stress the specific legal context of the inquiry into ordinary 
meaning, thereby removing the question from the (quasi-)sociological 
to the legal: ‘Our approach to construction has not proceeded on the 
basis of some textual “ordinary meaning” but on the legislative intent 
made evident by their enactment history in the light of the Corbett 
decision’ (para 53). This had the effect of uncoupling the issue of 
statutory interpretation from the constitutional argument, and freed 
the judgment from the fictional constraints of an imagined Hong 
Kong consensus about the meanings of the word man and woman. The 
majority then aligned the law in Hong Kong with modern human rights 
law, distancing themselves from the Christian ‘emphasis on procreative 
sexual intercourse being an essential purpose of the matrimonial union’ 
and drawing on the dissenting judgment in Bellinger in the Court of 
Appeal (2001): ‘the world that engendered those classic definitions [of 
marriage] has long since gone. We live in a multi-racial, multi-faith 
society’ (para 128, per Thorpe LJ). 
The conservative-Chinese-Christian nexus that marked the High 
Court judgment was emphatically set aside as the Court stepped 
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beyond the constraints of the Hong Kong context to align the law 
with international human rights trends. It pointed to the UK Gender 
Recognition Act as a ‘compelling model’ (para 38). The messy 
sociolinguistic issue of the ordinary meanings of man and woman 
in Hong Kong usage (English and Chinese/Cantonese) was once 
again submerged within the presumption of a unified language of 
the common law. A dissenting judgment by Patrick Chan PJ however 
insisted on Hong Kong as a distinctive conceptual space (para 188):
In my view, the present position in Hong Kong is quite different 
from that in Europe and the UK when Goodwin was decided. While 
there was evidence of the changing attitudes in both Europe and 
the UK, I do not think there is sufficient evidence to show that the 
circumstances in Hong Kong are such as to justify the Court giving 
an interpretation to art 37 to include transsexual men and women for 
the purpose of marriage. 
The use of the word ‘circumstances’ resonates with the early colonial-
era discussions of the distinct nature of Hong Kong society (para 188): 
As pointed out earlier, there is no evidence showing that for the purpose 
of marriage, the ordinary meanings of man and woman in Hong Kong 
have changed to accommodate a transsexual man and woman. More 
importantly, there is no evidence that the social attitudes in Hong 
Kong towards the traditional concept of marriage and the marriage 
institution have fundamentally altered. Nor is there evidence on the 
degree of social acceptance of transsexualism.
Following the decision in the Court of Final Appeal the Legislative 
Council has begun debating how to respond to the decision, with the 
Council divided over the scope of any legislation. Priscilla Leung Mei-
fun, a ‘pro-establishment’ legislator, attacked recognition of transgender 
rights: ‘Hong Kong is not a Western society and should not follow 
Britain’s model, as this would lead to social chaos’ (Chui 2014). One 
theoretical issue is whether the traditional rights and privileges of New 
Territories, and lineage structure, would be affected by transgender 
status, such as how an affirmed gender identity which conflicted with 
the assigned category at birth would be understood in relation to 
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patrilinear lineage structures. Would an indigenous person who had 
been assigned a female identity at birth and who subsequently affirmed 
a male identity, including undergoing Sexual Reassignment Surgery, 
be entitled to build a ‘small house’? In the UK, matters pertaining to 
peerages are exempt from the effects of the Gender Recognition Act 
(section 16) (Jiang 2013: 69). 
As a footnote to the High Court decision in W v Registrar of 
Marriages, it is interesting to note that the judge, Andrew Cheung J, 
also presided over a controversial decision concerning customary rights. 
In Liu Ying Lan v Liu Tung Yiu and another the question at issue was 
whether the surviving daughters of deceased parents, who had not 
adopted a son to continue the male line, could inherit a property. The 
court heard expert evidence as well consulting directly the Qing code, 
both in the original and in translation. The father had died in 1943, and 
the mother in 1987. Among the legal issues exotic to the common law 
was the possible validity of the posthumous adoption of an adult carried 
out by members of the lineage. There was one Hong Kong authority 
to this effect from 1954, In the Goods of Chan Tse Shi, deceased, and a 
powerful underlying cultural logic to this custom (para 49)
the rationale of the device to continue the male line is not difficult 
to guess or understand by anyone with some general understanding 
of the traditional Chinese society and its conventional or Confucius 
values and thinking. 
The judgment continues with a length quotation from Jamieson’s 
Chinese Family and Commercial Law (1921), beginning with the 
statement that (cited, para 49):
The foundation of Chinese society is the Family, and the religion 
is Ancestral Worship. Ancestral Worship is not a thing which the 
community as a whole can join in; it is private to each individual family, 
meaning by family all those who can trace through male descent to a 
common Ancestor, however numerous, and however remotely related. 
Based on this understanding of Chinese society the judgment 
explicitly adopted the view that the inheritance of the property by the 
daughters was a solution ‘almost as a matter of last resort’ (para 55). 
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While the claim of the particular male relative (a nephew) was rejected 
(since he had already inherited property from his own father), it sent 
the matter back to the lineage in order to allow time for another male 
relative to be found or adopted. This judgment took its reference points 
from a socio-legal imaginary radically at odds with the constitutional 
framework underlying Hong Kong’s post-1997 legal order, with its 
promises of equality before the law in the Bill of Rights and the Basic 
Law. It envisaged a pure type of Chinese customary law, in which there 
was no room even to debate flexibility and a context-sensitive solution. 
One comment from the Strickland report seems pertinent here 
(1953: 67): ‘It is somewhat disturbing that in nearly every case in which 
the Courts in Hong Kong have had to inquire into Chinese law and 
custom there has been conflicting evidence on some material point 
with which the Court is concerned’ (see also Chan 1998; 2001; Chan 
2013). A glance at an in-depth scholarly discussion of the nature of 
Qing law suggests that reading the Qing text as if it were a common law 
statute is a perilous undertaking (Su 1999). In the event, the decision 
was reversed on appeal (Liu Ying Lan v Liu Tung Yiu and another), on 
the grounds that the Adoption Ordinance (1972) had been intended to 
bring an end to posthumous adoption under customary law (para 49). 
In any case the High Court judge had been ‘over-cautious’: 
Sixty years had passed since the death of the deceased. Apart from 
the 1st defendant no one from the Liu clan had come forward and 
made a claim to succeed the deceased. After the present proceedings 
was commenced in 1992, no member had applied to be joined as a 
co-defendant (para 69). 
One can understand the Court of Appeal to be saying that the 
original judgment had been ‘hyper-Chinese’ in its approach. In debates 
over legal pluralism one important strand of argument has been about 
the Romanticisation of nonstate, indigenous or ‘folk’ law (Galanter 
1981; Sharafi 2008). In Hong Kong the other side of this coin is the 
Romanticisation of colonial common law.
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6 Conclusion
In the history of the Hong Kong jurisdiction, questions of conceptual 
and legal equivalence have arisen primarily in relation to marked or 
foregrounded elements of traditional Chinese culture. In such cases 
the issue is the mapping of Chinese concepts and institutions onto 
Western, specifically English, ones and the reduction of anthropological 
complexity to ‘yes-no’ distinctions expressed in terms of common law 
categories such as: ‘wife or not wife’. But, for much of its history, 
specific Chinese customs aside, Hong Kong has been treated as a 
sub-domain of the universal common law jurisdiction (centred in 
England and Wales). Principles of English law and the categories of 
the English language (both legal and those of ordinary language) have 
been applied as a matter of course to factual scenarios arising, to use 
Cozens-Hardy’s words, in a world ‘beyond that, elsewhere’. This had 
led to the ‘legal ghettoisation’ of Chinese culture, and a stereotyped 
polarisation of the modern and the traditional characteristics of Hong 
Kong society. 
Postcolonial theory often attempts to resolve (or at least particularise) 
the dilemma represented by colonial modernity by studying the 
interface between the local and the global (Lee 2000; Merry and 
Stern 2005) and by pointing to or imagining alternative, non-Western 
modernities (for a survey and critique, see Dirlik 2013). In so doing, it 
draws both on the ‘too much modernity’ and the ‘too little modernity’ 
strands of critique, but goes further to point out that notions of ‘the 
traditional’ are formulated in a complex reaction to, and interaction 
with, colonial modes of knowledge and governance. Colonial social 
engineering in the name of respect for difference, it is argued, has led 
to ‘an eternally frozen monolithic indigenous Han-Chinese culture’ 
which is understood as ‘essentially patriarchal’ (Chiu 2006: 50). 
The irony of Hong Kong’s colonial legacy is that social progressiveness, 
equality and freedom of individual expression is now defined in 
opposition to ‘Chineseness’ (see Wat 2011). This ‘Chineseness’ is a 
mix of re-imagined Confucianism and Leninist authoritarianism. 
The notions of respect for hierarchy and patriarchal, monogamous 
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family values are not greatly distinct from social, specifically Christian, 
conservatism in the West. The representatives of this normative, state-
sponsored Chineseness include the same class of business tycoons 
who formed the economic leadership of Hong Kong in the later 
stages of British rule, as well as a political party strongly supported 
by the authorities in Beijing, namely the Democratic Alliance for 
the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB), and the Heung 
Yee Kuk, the colonial-era institution set up to represent the rural-
indigenous villagers. 
As a result of the processes described in this paper, ‘Chineseness’ 
in Hong Kong is identified in the socio-legal sphere with everything 
anti-progressive, as if this was an inevitable and fixed cultural fact. 
Given this polarisation of rights discourse between a ‘non-progressive 
Chineseness’ and the ‘progressive West’, and the importance of an 
idealised ‘rule of law’ within Hong Kong popular imaginary (Tam 
2013), it has become a logical tactic for the Court of Final Appeal to 
seek to maintain Hong Kong’s alignment with UK law and thereby 
reassert the conceptual unity of the common law, especially given the 
impact on UK law of the European Court of Human Rights. And given 
the surreal reinvention of colonialism as equivalent to international 
human rights, it has become a logical tactic for disaffected young 
people to wave the Hong Kong colonial flag and the Union Jack, 
as a provocation to the ‘pro-Beijing’ Hong Kong establishment and 
officials of the Central People’s Government (Cheung et al 2013). The 
Occupy Central (Umbrella Movement) demonstrations, which erupted 
in Hong Kong in late September 2014, are an evident symptom of 
this polarisation of rights discourse and of the profound alienation of 
many Hong Kong young people from the normative identity labels and 
symbols promoted by the political establishment.
Notes
Christopher Hutton is Chair Professor of English at the University of 
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1  I am not referring here to ‘high’ jurisprudential debates about legal 
interpretation but rather to the principles that common law judges appeal 
to in mundane decisions when faced with a problematic term in a statute 
or a contract, and the basic rules of legal interpretation taught to first-year 
law students. The jurisprudential status of these assumptions is of course 
highly contentious.
2  In recent years Chinese/Cantonese is increasingly being used as a language 
of law, but as this article is primarily historical in focus this important 
issue will not be pursued here.
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